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PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION UNDER THE
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMMISSION ACT OF 1974: THE
CURRAN DECISION
Commodity futures' trading has undergone a fundamental transfor-
mation over the last decade in both the nature of the trade2 and in the
unheralded expansion of the industry itself.3 The public, however, has
lost faith in the concept of industry self-regulation4 in light of recent
allegations of fraud,' financial ruin,6 and most notably, market manip-
ulation.7 Although subject to extensive governmental regulation and
remedial protection for investors,8 the trading of commodity futures re-
mains the "least forgiving business."9 After the creation of the Com-
1. A commodity futures contract is a contract to sell (a short contract) or buy (a long con-
tract) a fixed quantity of goods at a uniform grade to be delivered in the future. Because the
quantity and quality are fixed, commodity futures contracts are fungible, and are frequently
traded before delivery. See The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 128-29, 134-37 (Comm.
Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as Senate Committee Print]; J. BURNS, A TREATISE ON MARKETS 31-
33 (1979).
2. Early commodities trading involved agricultural commodities, conducted principally by
producers and industrial consumers. During this period the primary aim of the trade was hedg-
ing; that is, fixing profits or costs in the future. Beginning in the late 1960s, the character of the
trade shifted from hedging to speculation. The decline of agricultural surpluses and the influx of
foreign buyers into the market removed the cushion that had discouraged market manipulation in
the past. With the growth in speculation came increased participation of traders without any
connection to the production or distribution of agricultural commodities. See generally Review of
Commodity Exchange Act and Discussion of Possible Changes: Hearings Before the House Comm.
on Agriculture, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 House Hearing]; H.R. REP.
No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 36-39 (1974); S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-15, 18-19
reprnted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 5843, 5852-56, 5858-59.
3. At the time the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act (CFTCA) was passed in
1974, fewer than 20 million regulated and unregulated futures contracts were traded, with a total
worth of approximately $300 billion. By 1978, the number of contracts traded had grown to 75
million, with a total worth in excess of $1.6 trillion. See Extend Commodity Exchange Act: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Conservation and Credit of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 269 (1978).
4. See 1973 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 11.
5. See infra note 15.
6. See infra note 170.
7. See infra note 15.
8. See infra notes 19-30 & 46-58 and accompanying text.
9. D. MORGAN, MERCHANTS OF GRAIN 405-42 (1979). Commodity brokers usually require
a demonstrated net worth of $50,000 or more of liquid assets before they will open a trading
account for a customer. In part, this is necessary to meet margin calls, but it also reflects the fact
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modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in 1974, aggrieved
traders increasingly argued that courts should imply a private right of
action against futures commission merchants, t° exchanges, " and fellow
traders under the CFTC Act of 1974.12 Because of the Act's unique
trader protections 3 and judicial reluctance to imply private rights of
action from sparse statutory language,' 4 the lower federal courts di-
vided on the question of whether a private right of action could be
implied.' 5 The Supreme Court answered the question affirmatively in
that four out of five first-time traders lose money. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 514-17
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
10. Futures commission merchants are
individuals, associations, partnerships, corporations, and trusts engaged in soliciting or
in accepting orders for the purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery on or
subject to the rules of any contract market and that, in or connection with such solicita-
tion or acceptance of orders, accepts any money, securities, or property (or extends credit
in lieu thereof) to margin, guarantee, or secure any trades or contracts that result or may
result therefrom.
7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
11. There are ten regulated exchanges in the United States and three unregulated exchanges.
See Senate Committee Print, supra note 1, at 133. To be registered, a board of trade applies for a
designation as a contract market with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and agrees to
enforce rules designed to maintain on orderly market. 7 U.S.C. § 8 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
12. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
13. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
14. Id
15. Several district courts have found a private right of action for fraud. See Shelley v. Noff-
singer, 511 F. Supp. 687, 689 (N.D. Il. 1981); Christensen Hatch-Farms v. Peavey, 505 F. Supp.
903, 910 (D. Minn. 1981); Berenson v. Madda, COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,689 (D.D.C.
1980); Grayson v. ContiCommodity Serv., COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,033 (D.D.C. 1980),
aff'd, 688 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1982); Witzel v. Chartered Sys., 490 F. Supp. 343, 345 (D. Minn.
1980); Croll v. Maduff, 487 F. Supp. 1381, 1382 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Navigator Group Funds v.
Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 416, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Alken v. Lerer, 485 F.
Supp. 871, 879 (D.N.J. 1980); Demoe v. Dean Witter & Co., 476 F. Supp. 275, 278 (D. Alaska
1979); R.J. Hereley & Son Co. v. Stotler & Co., 466 F. Supp. 345, 349 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Jones v.
B.C. Christopher & Co., 466 F. Supp. 213, 221 (D. Kan. 1979); Poplar Grove Planting & Ref, Co.
v. Bache Halsey Stuart Inc., 465 F. Supp. 585, 590 (M.D. La. 1979); Milani v. ContiCommodity
Serv., 462 F. Supp. 405,407 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Gravois v. Fairchild, COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH)
20,706 (E.D. La. 1978); Hofmayer v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 733, 737-38 (N.D.
Cal. 1978); Kelley v. Carr, 442 F. Supp. 346,354 (W.D. Mich. 1977); Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc.
v. Lumber Merchants, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 559, 561 (S.D. Fla. 1976); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Lewis,
410 F. Supp. 416, 419 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
Similarly, courts have held exchanges liable for failure to prevent market manipulation. See
Strax v. Commodity Exch., Civ. No. 79-5366 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Pollock v. Citrus Assocs., 512 F.
Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. II. 1979).
On the other hand, a significant minority of district courts have denied a private right of action
under the CFTCA. See, e.g., Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., v. Conaway, 515 F. Supp.
202, 209 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (no private right of action for contract dispute; reparations procedure
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss2/7
PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith. 16
This Note proposes that the civil and criminal remedies created in
1974 provide adequate protection for the trading public and the integ-
rity of the commodity markets, and that the courts have created a su-
perfluous remedy in the private right of action. The first section of the
Note traces the historical development of commodity regulation and
the recently created claim settlement procedures of the CFTC Act
(CFTCA). The second section discusses Curran in light of prior com-
modity law and in the broader context of statutory construction. The
third section examines the indicia of congressional intent for creating a
private right of action as a remedy for violations of the Act. Finally,
the Note considers the impact of the recently implied private right of
action on the regulation and conduct of commodity markets and trade.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
REGULATION
Federal regulation of commodity futures trading began sixty years
ago with the Grain Futures Act of 1922.'" Prompted by concern over
the adverse impact of price volatility and anticompetitive practices on
producers and consumers,'8 Congress focused on the control of specu-
the exclusive remedy); Walsh v. International Precious Metals Corp., 510 F. Supp. 867, 870-71 (D.
Utah 1981) (no private right of action for broker fraud); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Carter, Rodgers & Whitehead & Co., 497 F. Supp. 450, 452-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (no claim that
reparations inadequate); Gonzalez v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 499, 503
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same); Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1345,
1358 (D. Nev. 1980) (same); Stone v. Saxon & Windsor Group Ltd., 485 F. Supp. 1212, 1216-19
(N.D. IUl. 1980) (no private right of action for violation of options trading prohibition); Alkan v.
Rosenthal, COMM. Ftr. L. REP. (CCH) 20,797 (D.D.C. 1979) (no private right of action for
failure to execute a trading order); Fischer v. Rosenthal, 481 F. Supp. 53, 55-57 (N.D. In1. 1979)
(no private right of action for excessive speculation and market manipulation) Berman v. Bache,
Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 311, 321-23 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (no private right of action
for broker fraud and account churning); Consolo v. Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, Inc.,
436 F. Supp. 447, 454 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (broken fraud); Bartels v. International Commodities
Corp., 435 F. Supp. 865, 868-70 (D. Conn. 1977) (same); Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., v. French, 425
F. Supp. 1231, 1234 (D.D.C. 1977) (failure to execute trading order).
16. 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982). The Court held that customers could bring a private right of
action against brokers for fraud and deceptive practices and against commodity exchanges for
failure to prevent market manipulation. See infra notes 108-27 and accompanying text.
17. Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
18. Section 3 of the Grain Futures Act declared:
[T]he transactions and prices of grain on such boards of trade are susceptible to specula-
tion, manipulation, and control, and sudden or unreasonable fluctuations in the prices
Number 2]
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lation and market manipulation in drafting the Act of 1922.' 9 The Act
empowered the Secretary of Agriculture to restrict grain trade to
boards of trade which had been designated "contract markets."20 The
Secretary implicitly relied on self-regulation when designating and su-
pervising contract markets.21 In 1936, the Commodity Exchange Act
(CEA) 22 laid the foundation of modem substantive protection for the
trading public. By prohibiting fraudulent practices among members of
the contract markets,23 delegating administrative discretion to set limits
on speculative trading,2' and mandating the registration of futures
commission merchants and floor brokers,25 the 1936 Act marked a shift
in regulatory emphasis from the control of market forces to the protec-
tion of investors.
The enforcement procedures of the 1936 Act, however, contemplated
violations which offended the public generally rather than a particular
trader. For example, trading professionals who violated the Act risked
thereof frequently occur as a result of such speculation, manipulation, or control, which
are detrimental to the producer or consumer and the persons handling grain and prod-
ucts and by-products thereof in interstate commerce, and that such fluctuations in prices
are an obstruction to and a burden upon interstate commerce in grain and the products
and by-products thereof and render regulation imperative for the protection of such
commerce and the national public interest therein.
Id § 3, 42 Stat. 999 (1922) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 3 (1976).
19. Id
20. Id § 6, 42 Stat. 1001 (1922) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 8 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
21. See supra note 4.
22. Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (current version at 7 U.S.C
§§ 1-22 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
23. Id § 4b, 49 Stat. 1493 (1936). Section 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act read in rele-
vant part:
It shall be unlawful for any member of a contract market, or for any correspondent,
agent, or employee of any member, in or in connection with any order to make, or in the
making of (1) any contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, or, (2) any
contract of sale of any commodity for future delivery made, or to be made, on or subject
to the rules of any contract market for or on behalf of any person...
(A) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such person;
(B) willfully to make or cause to be made to such person any false report or statement
thereof, or willfully to enter or cause to be entered for such person any false record
thereof;
(C) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive such person. . .; or
(D) to bucket (receipt of orders to purchase and sell stock without intention of actually
executing such orders) such order, or to fill such order by offset against the order or
orders of any other person, or willfully and knowingly and without the prior consent of
such person to become the buyer in respect to any selling order of such person, or be-
come the seller in respect to any buying order of such person.
Id (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976)).
24. Id § 4a, 49 Stat. 1492-93 (1936) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 6a (1976)).
25. Id §§ 4e, f, 49 Stat. 1495-96 (1936) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6e, 6f (1976)),
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suspension or revocation of their trading privileges,2 6 rather than liabil-
ity to individual parties. Similarly, the Act empowered the Secretary of
Agriculture to refuse trading privileges to "any person" involved in
market manipulation or violation of any provision of the Act.27 The
Secretary could suspend or revoke a board of trade's designation as a
contract market for failure to enforce rules mandated by the Act or the
Department of Agriculture.28 The Secretary could also issue cease and
desist orders to boards of trade or their agents if either violated the
provisions of the Act,29 or if they failed to enforce their own rules. °
The emphasis on proscriptive statutes and the coercion of futures
trading professionals left the settlement of private grievances in the
hands of the contract markets .3  Because traders in the market were
principally interested in the hedging and actual delivery of the underly-
ing commodity, the statutory remedies and contract market regulations
provided sufficient protection for individual traders.32 Subsequently,
however, a new class of traders, less interested in the hedging of com-
modity transactions and more interested in the speculative opportuni-
ties of the trade, began entering the market.33 Dissatisfied with
26. Id § 4g, 49 Stat. 1496 (1936) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 6g (1976)).
27. Id § 8. 49 Stat. 1498 (1936) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 8(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
28, Id § 5b, 49 Stat. 1498 (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 13a (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
29 Id § 6b, 49 Stat. 1500 (1936) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 13a (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
30. Commodity Exchange Act Amendments of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-258, § 12, 82 Stat. 26, 29
(current version at 7 U.S.C. § 7a(8), (12) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
31. The exchanges developed their own informal settlement procedures which included arbi-
tration and mediation of customer grievances. In addition, exchanges would deny trading privi-
leges to floor brokers and commodity merchants who violated the exchange's informal and formal
rules of conduct. See generally 1973 House Hearings, supra note 2. Each of the exchanges called
before the House Agricultural Committee noted that the informal procedures were incorporated
into their exchange's rules. See, e.g., id at 73, 97, 118, 131, 138, 197 (statements of various ex-
change officers).
32. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. In part, the limited number of traders and the
fact that the buyer and seller usually knew each other produced the efficacy of self-enforcement.
Indeed, it was more than 30 years after the Commodity Exchange Act was passed before a private
right of action was first asserted in Goodman v. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Il. 1967).
33. See supra note 2. See also S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5843. The Senate Report indicated that since 1968 the function of
the commodity markets had shifted from surplus allocation to a market-oriented economy in
which markets establish price as well as organize the marketing of commodities. Such a shift led
to increased speculation in the market.
The shift to market-oriented economy has brought the general public into the futures
markets in growing numbers. Speculators are attracted to the futures markets by the
wide price swings and the possibility of large profits. Such an increase in trading by the
speculative public, while useful to hedgers, brings with it potential market problems. If
individual speculators or groups operating in concert obtain control of the futures mar-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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industry settlement of their complaints, aggrieved traders sought fed-
eral court relief for violations of the Commodity Exchange Act.
The first recognition of a private right of action under the Act came
in Goodman v. Hentz.34 Adopting a tort theory of liability for the im-
plication of a private right of action, the Goodman court reasoned that
the violation of a legislative act designed to protect the interest of an-
other created a cause of action in favor of the protected party.35 Fed-
eral courts unanimously held thereafter that individuals could maintain
a private right of action under the Commodity Exchange Act on allega-
tions of broker fraud36 or account churning37 as well as for a market's
failure to enforce its own rules or those of the Department of
Agriculture.38
The imposition of liability on exchanges for failing to enforce their
kets, price manipulation, comers and squeezes can occur, with adverse effects on produ-
cers and consumers alike.
id at 5859.
34. 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
35. According to the Goodman court:
Violations of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act makes the actor liable for
an invasion of the interest of another if. (1) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or
in part to protect the interest of the other as an individual; and (2) the interest invaded is
one which the enactment is intended to protect .... Violation of the standard of con-
duct set out in Section 6b of the Commodity Exchange Act is a tort for which the plain-
tiffs, as members of the class Congress sought to protect from the type of harm they
allege here, have a federal civil remedy in the absence of specific mention of a civil
remedy in the Commodity Exchange Act.
Id at 447 (citations omitted).
36. The decision in Goodman was followed by a line of cases all asserting that the Goodman
decision controlled on the question of the availability of a private right of action for broker fraud.
See, eg., Arnold v. Bache & Co., Inc., 377 F. Supp. 61, 65 & n. 11 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Johnson v.
Arthur Epsey, Shearson, Hammill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); McCurnin v.
Kohlmeyer & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1338, 1342 (E.D. La. 1972); Anderson v. Francis I. DuPont & Co.,
291 F. Supp. 705,710 (D. Minn. 1968). Seealso United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 311 F.
Supp. 1375, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (finding a private right of action for dissemination of false
information).
37. "Churning" refers to rapid, successive trading of a customer's account-an account typi-
cally discretionary or within the broker's control. After churning, the customer may find the ac-
count is exhausted by commission fees. In Johnson v. Arthur Epsey, Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
341 F. Supp. 764, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), the court described such excessive trading as fraud and
deceit within the meaning of 7 U.S.C. § 6b. When presented with allegations of churning, courts
implied a private right of action under the 1936 Act. See Johnson v. Arthur Epsey, Shearson,
Hammill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp.
417 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
38. See, eg., Case & Co. v. Board of Trade, 523 F.2d 355, 362-63 (7th Cir. 1975) (temporary
suspension of price fluctuation rule); Deaktor v. Schreiber, 479 F.2d 529, 534-35 (7th Cir. 1973)
(failure to prevent price manipulation), ree'don other grounds sub nom. Chicago Mercantile Exch.
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own rules or to maintain an "orderly market" marked the beginning of
a breakdown in industry self-regulation. 9 Responding to judicial will-
ingness to imply a private right of action for violation of exchange
rules, the exchanges began eliminating unenforceable rules in an effort
to limit their liability.' The decline in exchange vigilance, coupled
with a decrease in commodity surpluses in the 1970's, made the com-
modity exchanges more susceptible to manipulation and abuse.4
Traders, increasingly dissatisfied with the deterioraton of industry self-
regulation, urged government regulators to increase supervision of the
v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973); Seligson v. New York Produce Exch. 378 F. Supp. 1076, 1084
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (failure to maintain an orderly market).
In Deaktor, the court held that a private right of action was available against an exchange that
failed to prevent price manipulation and market cornering in pork bellies futures. 479 F.2d at 534.
The principal issue, however, was whether the Commodity Exchange Commission should exercise
primary jurisdiction in the enforcement of contract market duties. Id at 531-34. The Supreme
Court had previously held, in Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973), that the
Commodity Exchange Commission had primary jurisdictional control over the regulated ex-
changes. The Supreme Court reversed Deaktor and held that parties seeking damages because of
exchange actions must first resort to the Commission's hearing procedure. 414 U.S. at 115.
39. The contract market provides as its principal duty an orderly point of concentrated fu-
tures marketing activities. The primary general duties include responsibility for the prevention of
false rumors and inaccurate reports, 7 U.S.C. § 7(c), and the prevention of price manipulation and
cornering, 7 U.S.C. § 7(d). Economically, however, "orderly market" refers to the ability of a
contract market to indicate prices which accurately reflect supply and demand.
"Disorderly" refers to a situation in which a market is not operating properly within a
given economic environment. Under such circumstances, the optimal benefits of the
market cannot be realized. At least three types of disorderly market conditions may be
usefully distinguished.
1. A disorderly condition may exist when the price of a transaction is off a market's
demand and/or supply schedules. Artificial barriers to market entry-through monopo-
lies or monopsonies--are examples of such a condition.
2. In certain circumstances, a market may be susceptible to manipulation, not be-
cause of artificial barriers to market entry, but rather because of artificial barriers to
market information that allow false rumors to circulate ....
3. A wide price swing occasioned by overreaction to a prior price trend may also
create a disorderly market. This condition has often been characterized as destabilizing
speculation. Such price behavior, however, could be brought about by any type of
trader-commercial firm or speculator-in the market.
J. BURNS, supra note 1, at 10-11.
40. Some observors believe that the provision of the 1968 amendments requiring ex-
changes to enforce their own rules, thereby implicitly givingprivateparties the right to sue
for nonenforcement, has had a perverse effect. To avoid risk of litigation, exchange au-
thorities have been encouraged to reduce rather than strengthen rules designed to insure
fair trading.
120 CONG. REc. 10,748 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Thone) (emphasis added).
41. The trend coincided with the first major Russian wheat purchases in 1972 and the tempo-
rary embargo on soybean shipments to Japan in 1973. The Japanese soybean embargo came in
response to the trebling of soybean prices over the period of several months. See 1973 House
Hearings, supra note 2, at 3.
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markets and to modernize statutory regulation.42 On the other hand,
federal regulators questioned the efficacy of drastic coercive sanctions
as enforcement tools when compared to civil damages.43 Designed to
strengthen the regulation of commodity trade under the 1936 Act," the
enactment in 1974 of the CFTCA marked a shift in the emphasis of
commodity rule enforcement. Although federal law still required the
exchanges to make and enforce rules, Congress gave the newly created
Commodity Futures Trading Commission primary rulemaking author-
ity.45 The CFTCA substantially increased fines and penal sanctions for
larceny and embezzlement, 46 unfair trade practices, 47 broker miscon-
duct,48 and nonenforcement of rules by the exchanges. 49
In contrast to the informal settlement procedures previously con-
42. See id at II (statement by Rep. Smith).
43. As noted by Representative Smith:
In many instances, the CEA at the present time must, as a practical matter, either
impose or threaten severe sanctions or nothing at all. The authority to impose civil
money penalties or more modest sanctions would, in all likelihood, be used more and be
a greater deterrent toward preventing some of the abuses under the present situation.
Id at 12. (emphasis added).
44. Congress declared the purpose of the Act as follows: "An Act to amend the Commodity
Exchange Act to strengthen the regulation of futures trading, to bring all agricultural and other
commodities traded on exchanges under regulation, and for other purposes." Commodity Futures
Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389.
45. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission replaced the Commodity Exchange Com-
mission which had been composed of the Secretaries of Agriculture and Treasury and the Attor-
ney General. The new Commission is an independent agency composed of five appointed
commissioners. 7 U.S.C. § 49(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Its duties include the approval of
exchange rules, 7 U.S.C. § 7a(8), (12) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), which effectively removes rulemak-
ing authority from the exchanges and places it in the hands of the Commission.
46. Congress made the offenses felonies, punishable, in the case of an individual, by a fine of
not more than $100,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, and in all other
cases by a fine of $500,000 or the same term of imprisonment, or both. 7 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
47. Price manipulation, cornering, and the dissemination of false information were made
felonies subject to a fine of $500,000, five years imprisonment, or both. 7 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
48. A knowing violation of 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1976), which regulates the conduct of brokers, is a
felony punishable by a fine of not more than $500,000 or imprisonment not exceeding five years,
or both. 7 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). If the violation is by an individual, the fine shall
not exceed $100,000. 7 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
49. If the Commission finds that a contract market or its agents fail to enforce their own rules
or have violated any section of the Act, the Commission may assess a fine of $100,000 for each
violation and issue a cease and desist order. Significantly, in assessing fines against the exchanges,
the Commission must "consider whether the amount of the penalty will materially impair the
contract market's ability to carry on its operations and duties." 7 U.S.C. § 13a (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
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ducted by the contract markets, the CFTCA called for formal struc-
tures for the settlement of customer claims. The Act required contract
markets to establish an arbitration procedure for the settlement of dis-
putes between customers and members of the contract markets." That
requirement, however, simply recognized in law the procedure that the
contract markets had provided informally. The nonbinding effect of
the arbitration procedures, and their jurisdiction over only small
claims,5 limits the effectiveness of arbitration and has done little to
strengthen enforcement. 2 More importantly, the CFTCA increased
the protection of individual traders by creating a private right of action
before administrative law judges. 3 The Act allows persons com-
plaining of violations of the CFTCA or exchange rules to petition the
Commission for an investigation and hearing.54 Upon finding a viola-
tion, the Commission can order the payment of damages, 5 which is
50. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(l1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) reads in relevant part:
Each contract market shall-
(11) provide a fair and equitable procedure through arbitration or otherwise ... Pro-
vided, That (i) the use of such procedure by a customer shall be voluntary, (ii) the proce-
dure shall not be applicable to any claim in excess of $15,000, (iii) the procedure shall
not result in any compulsory payment except as agreed upon between the parties, and
(iv) the term "customer" as used in this paragraph shall not include a futures commission
merchant or floor broker.
51. Id
52. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
53. 7 U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).)
54. 7 U.S.C. §§ 18(a), (b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) provide in relevant part:
(a) any person complaining of any violation of any provision of this chapter or any
rule, regulation, or order thereunder by any person who is registered or required to be
registered under section 6d, 6e, 6j, or 6m of this title may, at any time within two years
after the cause ofaction accrues, apply to the Commission by petition which shall briefly
state the facts, whereupon, if, in the opinion of the Commission, the facts therein warrant
such action, a copy of the complaint thus made shall be forwarded by the Commission to
the respondent, who shall be called upon to satisfy the complaint, or to answer it in
writing, within a reasonable period to be prescribed by the Commission.
(b) If there appear to be, in the opinion of the Commission, any reasonable grounds for
investigating the complaint and may, if in its opinion the facts warrant such action, have
such complaint served by registered mail or otherwise on the respondent and afford such
person an opportunity for a hearing thereon before an Administrative Law Judge ....
Id (emphasis added).
By its terms, 7 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) permits recovery of damages only from
futures commission merchants, floor brokers, and commodity trading advisors or commodity pool
operators. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6(d), (e), (f) (1976). Reparations proceedings are thus not available to
parties claiming damages either from other large traders or from exchanges for manipulation or
permitting the manipulation of market prices. Both offending parties, however, would be subject
to criminal and monetary penalties. See supra notes 48-50.
55. 7 U.S.C. § 18(e) (1976) states:
If after a hearing on a complaint... the Commission determines that the respondent
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enforceable in federal district courts5 6 and reviewable in federal circuit
courts.5 7
From 1974 until the recent decision in Curran, lower federal courts
attempted to ascertain whether Congress intended the reparations pro-
ceedings as the exclusive remedial device to be exhausted before resort
to the courts. The Court in Curran held that it did not.58
A. The Development of an Implied Right of Action Under the
CFTCA-the Searchfor Jurisdiction
Initial interpretations of the CFTCA focused on the balance of juris-
diction between the courts and the Commission.5 9 The confusion arose
from the peculiar wording of section 2 of the Act. Section 2 gave the
Commission "exclusive jurisdiction" over the regulation of all contracts
for future delivery, but preserved the "jurisdiction conferred on federal
and state courts."60 This ambiguous statutory language forced courts
to consider whether the private right of action previously implied sur-
has violated any provisions of this chapter, or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder,
the Commission shall,... determine the amount of damages, if any, to which such
person is entitled as a result of such violation and shall make an order directing the
offender to pay such person complaining such amount on or before such date fixed in the
order.
56. 7 U.S.C. § 18(f) (1976).
57. 7 U.S.C. § 18(g) (1976).
58. See supra note 16.
59. Early interpretations of the Act divided on the question of whether the CFTC had pri-
mary jurisdiction for the enforcement of the Act. The courts that maintained that judicial en-
forcement was available in the first instance often asserted that section 2 of the Act preserved
jurisdiction, or more generally, that courts had a right under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 to review any act of
Congress regulating interstate commerce. See Kelley v. Carr, 442 F.Supp. 346, 354 (W.D. Mich.
1977) (private right of action exists independently); Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Lumber
Merchants, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 559, 561 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (reparations not mandatory); E.F. Hutton
& Co. v. Lewis, 410 F. Supp. 416, 419 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (courts have jurisdiction to hear issues
arising under an Act of Congress).
In contrast, other courts suggested that Congress designed the new enforcement superstructure
to serve as the initial forum for grievances. See Consolo v. Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill,
Noyes, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 447, 454 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (necessary to exhaust administrative reme-
dies); Bache Halsey Stuart v. French, 425 F. Supp. 1231, 1234 (D.D.C. 1977) (Congress intended
public enforcement); Arkoosh v. Dean Witter & Co., 415 F. Supp. 535, 540 (D. Neb. 1976) (statu-
tory violations remedied by recourse to administrative remedies).
60. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) provides in relevant part:
the Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to. . . transactions involv-
ing contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a contract
market designated pursuant to section 7 of this title and any other board of trade, ex-
change, or market, and any transactions subject to regulation by the Commission ....
Nothing is this section shall supercede or limit the jurisdiction conferred on the courts of
the United States or any State.
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vived the CFTCA. Typically, courts either decided to defer to the
Commission's "primary jurisdiction"'" or asserted that decisions prior
to the enactment of the CFTCA that implied a private right of action
still control.62
In 1977, the court in Bartels v. International Commodities Corp.63
held that the CFTCA extinguished an independent private right of ac-
tion. Reasoning that a customer must first invoke the reparations pro-
cedure before seeking a judicial remedy, the Bartels court concluded
that no private right of action exists under the Act until the plaintiff
exhausts administrative remedies." After Bartels, other courts con-
strued the reparations procedure as an expression of congressional in-
tent to provide an initial forum for settlement of claims.65
Other courts relied on Cort v. Ash,66 a case involving a federal cam-
paign contribution statute,67 for guidance in determining whether a
plaintiff could invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court under the
CFTCA. The Supreme Court identified four factors that courts should
consider in analyzing whether a statute implies a private right of action:
whether the plaintiff belonged to that class for whose benefit the statute
was enacted; whether legislative history indicates an intent to create a
private right of action; whether such a remedy is consistent with the
purposes of the statute; and whether such private rights of action are
61. See supra note 59. See also Gravois v. Fairchild, COMM. FTrr. L. REP. (CCH) 20,706, at
22,872 (E.D. La. 1978) (reparations proceedings not an exclusive remedy for common-law misrep-
resentation); Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co., 459 F. Supp. 733, 737-38 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (section 2
preserves court jurisdiction when there is no indication of an intent to require exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies); Milani v ContiCommodity Serv., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 405, 407 (N.D. Cal.
1976) (violations should be heard by courts, not private arbitrators).
62. See supra note 60. See also Jones v. B.C. Christopher & Co., 466 F. Supp. 213, 216-23
(D. Kan. 1979); Poplar Grove Planting & Ref. Co., v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 585,
590 (M.D. La. 1979); Kelley v. Carr, 442 F. Supp. 346, 354 (W.D. Mich. 1976).
63. 435 F. Supp. 865 (D. Conn. 1977).
64. Id at 870.
65. See, e.g., Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Conaway, 515 F. Supp. 202, 210 (N.D.
Alaska 1981); Stone v. Saxon & Windsor Group, Ltd., 485 F. Supp. 1212, 1221 (N.D. Ill. 1980);
Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53, 56-57 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Consolo v. Hornblower &
Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 447, 454-55 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Bache Halsey Stuart,
Inc. v. French, 425 F. Supp. 1231, 1234 (D.D.C. 1977).
66. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
67, Plaintiffs in Cori were stockholders in a corporation whose directors allegedly authorized
corporation campaign contributions in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 610. The Court held that the
criminal statute created no private right of action for stockholders suing derivatively or for citizens
generally. 422 U.S. at 69.
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traditionally or appropriately relegated to state law.68 In Liang v.
Hunt,69 the Northern District of Illinois denied a private right of action
to investors alleging injury from market manipulation.70 Specifically,
the Liang court argued that, under the first of the Cort factors, the an-
timanipulation statute was not created for the especial benefit of inves-
tors, but rather for the protection of producers and consumers.7' Two
other courts reasoned that, under the second of the Cort factors, the
existence of the reparation procedures in the CFTCA obviated the need
to imply a private right of action.7"
Nevertheless, a majority of district courts held that Congress in-
tended the reparations proceedings to merely supplement judicial vin-
dication of private rights, and that plaintiffs need not exhaust the
administrative remedies of the Act73 before seeking relief from the
courts. Courts frequently utilized one of two arguments. First, some
68. d at 78.
69. 477 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
70. Liang v. Hunt, 477 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Ill. 1979). The controversy in Liang involved the
Hunt family's purchase of 23 million bushels of soybeans-20 million in excess of the speculative
limit. The court held that the price manipulation provision of the CFTCA was a criminal statute
for the benefit of the general public, not an especial class. Id at 893. The court further held that
Congress did not intend the provision to expose alleged manipulators to widespread liability. Id
at 894. For an excellent account of the Hunt soybean episode and grain trading generally, see D.
MORGAN, supra note 9.
71. 477 F. Supp. at 893.
72. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Carter, Rodgers & Whitehead & Co., 497
F. Supp. 450, 452 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 492 F.
Supp. 1345, 1347 (D. Nev. 1980).
The Mullis court noted:
the broad ringe of enforcement powers granted to the CFTC, the provisions for private
administrative remedies and the Congressional instruction that the CFTC erect a 'sound
and strong federal regulatory policy governing futures trading' . . . all indicate that a
private right of action is neither necessary to . . . nor consistent with the legislative
scheme.
492 F. Supp. at 1357 (citations omitted).
73. Courts initially recognized the availability of a judicial forum of first instance in broker
fraud actions. See Shelley v. Noffsinger, 511 F. Supp. 687, 689-90 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Christensen
Hatch-Farms, Inc. v. Peavey Co., 505 F. Supp. 903, 907-08 (D. Minn. 1981); Berensen v. Madda,
COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,033, at 24,082 (D.D.C. 1980); Croll v. Maduff & Sons, Inc., 487
F. Supp. 1381, 1384 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Navigator Group Funds v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc.,
487 F. Supp. 416, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Alken v. Lerner, 485 F. Supp. 871, 879 (D.N.J. 1980); R.J.
Hereley & Son v. Stotler & Co., 466 F. Supp. 345, 347-48 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
During the period between 1974 and the decision in Curran, courts frequently rationalized the
rejection of the exhaustion of remedies requirement because of the language of 7 U.S.C. § 18,
which declares that a complaining party "may" petition the Commission for an investigation and
reparations hearing. See supra note 54. Conceivably, the significance of the contingent language
in section 18 begs the question because Congress did not declare what, if any, alternatives to
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courts asserted that the reenactment of legislation incorporates prior
judicial interpretations and that Congress' silence indicated approval of
prior judicial interpretations.74 Arguing that Congress was aware of
judicial implication of private rights of action under the Commodity
Exchange Act, these courts concluded that congressional failure to dis-
approve these decisions implied sub silentio approval.75 The second
argument focused on the language of section 2 of the Act.76 In
Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co. , the Northern District of California
rejected the exhaustion of remedies requirement first enunciated in
Bartels." Specifically, the court held that because Congress was aware
of the prior construction of the Commodity Exchange Act, it intended
the second provisio of section 2 to preserve federal court jurisdiction to
hear private claims under the new Act.79
B. The Second and Sixth Circuits: A Narrowing of Issues
By 1980, federal courts of appeals began to address the issue of
whether private rights of action could still be maintained under the
CFTCA. In Leist v. Simplot,8  the Second Circuit recognized a private
right of action against contract markets, brokers, and other traders for
violations of the antimanipulation provisions of the Act.8 Similarly,
the Sixth Circuit held in Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
reparations procedures exist. In other words, the choice may be between seeking an administra-
tive remedy or no remedy at all.
74. For an early statement of this position, see Van Vranken v. Helvering, 115 F.2d 709 (2nd
Cir. 1940) (Hand, L., J.).
75. The argument that Congress knew of prior constructions of the Act and approved the
holdings without mentioning them conflicts with the concept of sub silentio approval. Defined as
"(u)nder silence; without any notice being taken," BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1281 (5th ed. 1979),
sub slentio approval of private rights of action without congressional notice contradicts the prem-
ise of the reenactment maxim-Congress is presumed to know prior constructions of the reenacted
act. Nevertheless, courts still employ the argument. See Christensen Hatch-Farms, Inc. v. Peavey
Co., 505 F. Supp. 903, 907-08 (D. Minn. 1981); Witzel v. Chartered Systems Corp., 490 F. Supp.
343, 346 (D. Minn. 1980); Navigator Group Funds v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 487 F. Supp.
416, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Alken v. Lerner, 485 F. Supp. 871, 875 (D.N.J. 1980).
76. See supra note 60.
77. 459 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
78. Id at 738. See also R.J. Hereley & Son v. Stotler & Co., 466 F. Supp. 345, 347 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
79. 459 F. Supp. at 737. See also infra notes 116-18.
80. 638 F.2d 283 (2nd Cir. 1980), afrdsub nom. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982).
81. Id at 322-23.
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Smith, Inc. 82 that allegations of fraud and deceptive practices could
support an implied private right of action.83
In Leist, the court reviewed the history of commodity regulation and
enforcement under the Commodity Exchange Act.84 It then considered
the continued existence of a private right of action under the CFTCA
within the analytic framework of Cort. The court distinguished Cort
because, unlike the history of judicial interpretation of the CFTCA, no
line of cases implying private rights had developed prior to the enact-
ment of the statute under consideration in Cori.85 This distinction led
the court to reason that the proper inquiry was not whether Congress
intended to create a private right of action under the CFTCA, but
whether it intended to extinguish sub silentio an interpretation uni-
formly given the provisions prior to the 1974 amendments. 86 Noting
that speculators serve an important function in commodity markets87
and that their growing numbers and associated losses had prompted
passage of the CFTCA,"8 the court concluded that aggrieved specula-
tors met the first prong of the Cort test, because the statute was enacted
for a complaining party's especial benefit.8 9
The Leist court then conducted an extensive investigation of the
existence of any indicia of legislative intent to preserve a private right
of action.90 Judge Friendly, writing for the majority, emphasized that
the legislative history of the Act revealed congressional awareness of
82. 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980), af'd, 102 S.Ct. 1825 (1982).
83. Id at 229-36.
84. Id at 293-302.
85. Id at 303.
86. Id According to the majority:
The question would thus not be whether Congress intended to create a new private right
of action in 1974, but rather, whether it intended sub silentio to alter the significance that
had long been given these provisions by making other changes in the Act . . . . The
burden thus lies on those who urge that the 1974 amendments demonstrate an intention
to change prior law.
Id.
87. Id at 304. The court noted that while Congress often criticized speculation in grain trade
because of the deleterious effects on the market--especially manipulation-Congress recognized
the necessity of speculators in the market so as to bear the risks of price shifts which hedgers were
trying to avoid. Id at 305-07. Moreover, the court sought to differentiate "big speculators" from
small investors, arguing that the big speculator was not the object of congressional protection. Id
at 304-05.
88. Id at 305-06.
89. In something of a tautology, the court suggested that "[it is almost self-evident that legis-
lation regulating future trading was for the 'especial benefit' of futures traders." Id at 306-07,
90. Id at 307-21.
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implied rights of action under the Commodity Exchange Act.91 In
reaching this conclusion the court relied on statements made during
House92 and Senate hearings,93 and the House report,94 as indications
of congressional awareness of judicial intervention in the enforcement
of the Commodity Exchange Act. Given Congress' express knowledge
of prior judicial construction, the majority concluded that reenactment
of various portions of the Commodity Exchange Act created "an al-
most irrebuttable presumption" '9 that Congress intended to incorpo-
rate a judicially implied private right of action into the CFTCA. The
creation of a private right of action in reparations proceedings did not,
according to the majority, rebut the presumption.96 In particular, the
court argued that three factors supported the presumption. First, the
CFTCA limited the availability of reparations proceedings to claims
against only some of the potential market defendants. 97 Second, the
court concluded that Congress added the reparations proceedings as an
additional, nonexclusive remedy for the enforcement of a preexisting
duty.98 Finally, the court noted that an inconsistency would result if,
after finding that the purpose of the Act was to strengthen commodity
91. Id at 308-09.
92. In particular, the court relied on Committee Chairman Poage's statements on the House
floor that "when the Commodity Exchange Act was enacted, courts implied a private remedy for
individual litigants in the Commodity Exchange Act." Id at 308 (quoting 119 CONG. REC.
H41,333 (1973)). The court further suggested that congressional awareness of a private right of
action was a necessary step in the logic which impelled Congress to give the Commission power to
impose rules on the exchanges. Implied rights of action based on violations of exchange rules
caused the exchanges to retreat from rulemaking. Without this knowlege, Congress would not
have compelled the adoption of beneficial rules. Id at 309.
93. 638 F.2d at 309-10 (quoting Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 205, 317, 415, 737, 746).
94. 638 F.2d at 307-08.
95. Id at 310 (quoting Bennett v. Panama Canal Co., 475 F.2d 1280, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
The court noted that a contrary presumption, though possible, would "require an exceedingly
strong showing of an intention to abolish the private cause of action." Id at 311 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 312-14.
97. The CFTCA makes available the reparations procedure only against those registered or
required to be registered under sections 6d, 6e, 6j or 6m. These classes include futures commission
merchants (§ 6d), floor brokers (§ 6e), futures commission merchants and floor brokers trading on
their own account (§ 6j), and trading advisors or commodity pool operators (§ 6m). See supra
note 54.
98. 638 F.2d at 313. As the majority stated:
The case differs fundamentally from instances . . . where Congress, operating on a
tabula rasa, provided a new duty and certain express remedies to enforce that duty, and
the court applied the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. When as here Congress
adds a new remedy to enforce a preexisting duty, where other remedies had been clearly
recognized, it would be expected to say so if it meant the new remedy to be exclusive.
Id at 312-13. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is "[a] maxim of statutory interpretation mean-
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futures regulation, it concluded that the Act extinguished private rights
of action.99 In a lengthy dissent, Judge Mansfield criticized the major-
ity's theory of sub silentio approval of private rights of action and ar-
gued that the "pervasive panoply" of judicial and administrative
enforcement procedures obviated the need for such rights."°
In Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 101 the Sixth
Circuit recognized the continued existence of a private right of action
for broker misconduct in the handling of a discretionary trading ac-
count.102 In addition to a brief analysis of the four factors identified in
Cort,103 the Curran court emphasized the legal context in which Con-
gress enacted the CFTCA. Specifically, the court argued that congres-
sional knowledge of an implied right of action under the Commodity
Exchange Act coupled with the congressional intent of strengthening
commodity regulatory enforcement made it unlikely that Congress in-
tended to extinguish private rights of action. 4 The court argued that
Congress intended the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of section 2 of
the CFTCA to be a method of dividing regulatory jurisdiction between
ing that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521
(5th ed. 1979).
99. 638 F.2d at 613. Simply put, the majority's position was that the elimination of a remedy
did not strengthen enforcement. As a purely logical matter, however, a numerical reduction of
remedies is not inconsistent with stronger regulation.
100. Id at 329-31 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Rather than requiring the defending party to
prove that Congress intended to extinuish a previously implied private right of action after
amendment of a statute supporting such rights, Judge Mansfield insisted that the party asserting
such rights must prove the Congress intended to create anew such rights after amendment. The
majority's position, according to Judge Mansfield, "puts the cart before the horse" when Congress
has expressly provided remedies for violations of the statute. Id at 340.
Beyond the theory of statutory construction, Judge Mansfield maintained that each of the four
Cori factors dictated a result opposite to the majority's. He argued that Congress has never
viewed speculators as a class in need of especial benefit and that Congress reflected this view in
designing the structure of the CFTCA to benefit the general public. Id at 334-39. Further, Judge
Mansfield argued that the court should not infer an intent of Congress to preserve private rights of
action when the case originally implying such. rights was incorrectly decided. He observed that
Goodman v. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967), implied a private right of action
under the Commodity Exchange Act without ever purporting to examine legislative intent. In-
stead, the Goodman court implied a private right of action from the now-discarded tort theory of
liability. Id at 341-42. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
101. 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982).
102. Id at 230.
103. Id at 233-35. The court urged that investors as a class satisfied the first prong of Cort-
the especial class requirement. Id at 233-34. Thus defined, this could conceivably include a
larger group of speculators than was protected in Leist. See supra note 87.
104. 622 F.2d at 234-35.
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the CFTC and the Securities and Exchange Commission. It was not
intended as an implicit rejection of private rights of action. 105
Moreoever, the court concluded that courts should not invoke the pri-
mary jurisdiction of the CFTC, ° especially in light of the CFTC's
view that an implied right of action survived the CFTCA.t°7
II. THE CURRAN DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion and the "contemporary legal context"
The Supreme Court consolidated the Leist and Curran cases for the
specific purpose of considering the continued existence of a private
right of action under the CFTCA.108 In declaring that such rights con-
tinued to exist, the majority clarified and refined its enunciated princi-
ples of judicial construction. Although arguing that the tests developed
in Cort still applied to the question of implied private rights of action,
the Court stated that subsequent incremental erosion of the Cori deci-
sion had reduced the test to a single-factor inquiry: "the intent of Con-
gress."' 9 More important, the Court maintained that congressional
intent must be determined by focusing on the state of the law at the
time of enactment-the "contemporary legal context" in which a stat-
ute is enacted.l 0 Such an examination, the Court argued, is important
for determining what Congress' perception of the law was at the time of
enactment. In short, the majority held that if Congress reenacted a
statute with knowledge of an available private right of action under a
105, Id at 234 & nn.27, 28.
106. Id at 235.
107. Id at 235-36. The court argued that primary jurisdiction was properly invoked only
when private civil enforcement complicated the agency's regulatory role. Id at 235. Given the
CFTC's acquiescence in the implication of private rights of action, see id at 232, the court appar-
ently believed that the CFTC's regulatory role would be unimpaired. Id at 236.
108. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982).
109. Id at 1839 (quoting Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639
(1981)).
110. Id (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698-99 (1979)). The
Supreme Court in Curran stated:
[WMe must examine Congress' perception of the law that it was shaping or reshaping.
When Congress enacts new legislation, the question is whether Congress intended to
create a private remedy as a supplement to the express enforcement provisions of the
statute. When Congress acts in a statutory context in which an implied private remedy
has already been recognized by the courts, however, the inquiry logically is different.
Congress need not have intended to create a new remedy, since one already existed; the
question is whether Congress intended to preserve the preexisting remedy.
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provision of the statute, then the inquiry should focus on the intent to
preserve, not the possible creation of, a private right of action."' Be-
cause courts uniformly implied a private right of action prior to the
CFTCA, this rule constituted a part of the contemporary legal context
in 1974. The Court then concluded that the reenactment of provisions
supporting a private right of action provided evidence that Congress
intended to preserve such rights.' 2
An examination of the legislative history of the CFTCA led the ma-
jority to the same conclusion. The Court noted that during the 1973
hearings on the CFTCA, the exchanges complained about the effects of
private liability for nonenforcement of their rules. " The Court found
that Congress' decision to place supplemental rulemaking authority in
the hands of the new Commission, instead of eliminating the private
remedy, was consistent with the goal of the CFTCA to strengthen com-
modity regulatory enforcement." 4 Echoing the Second Circuit's rea-
soning in Leist, the majority considered the structural changes
instituted in the CFTCA in light of this goal. The Court concluded
that reparations proceedings were intended to supplement, not sup-
plant, a private right of action; their nonavailability against exchanges
and jurisdictional limitation are inconsistent with regulatory
strengthening."15
Ultimately, however, the Court found direct evidence that Congress
preserved a private right of action in the jurisdictional savings clause of
section 2 of the Act. 16 Noting the Senate's concern that the Commis-
sion's jurisdictional exclusivity might deprive the courts of jurisdiction,
the Court argued that Congress added the second proviso of section 2
for the express purpose of preserving the private remedy previously im-
pied.'17 In addition, the enhanced enforcement value associated with
111. Id
112. Id at 1839-40.
113. Id at 1841-42.
114. Id at 1842. The Court also found it to be significant that Congress refused to explicitly
repudiate a private right of action to ease the enforcement burden on the exchanges despite the
opportunity to do so. Id
115. Id at 1842-43.
116. Id at 1843. The Court explained that Congress added the clause in response to concerns
expressed in the Senate that conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the CFTC might deprive courts of
jurisdictional authority to hear commodity cases in the first instance. After such concerns were
expressed in the Senate, the House responded by adding the jurisdictional savings clause. Id at
1843 & nn. 81-85.
117. See supra note 116.
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a continued private remedy led the Court to the compelling inference
that Congress intended to preserve a private right of action."'
B. The Dissent Attacking "A Novel Legal Theory"
Justice Powell and three other dissenters" t9 attacked the majority's
position as contrary to the doctrine of separation of powers. Justice
Powell argued that the majority's position requires Congress to respond
to all facets of the contemporary legal context when reenacting provi-
sions of a statute. 20 Arguing that no such duty exists or could be im-
posed on Congress, the dissent urged that the majority was doubly
remiss because the contemporary legal context in 1974 was in a state of
confusion and error. 2' Specifically, Justice Powell argued that "the
law" in 1974, characterized only by a uniform agreement in the federal
district courts that an implied right of action existed under the Com-
modity Exchange Act, was based entirely on an erroneous decision ren-
dered in Goodman v. Hentz.122 The assertion that Congress has a duty
to respond to every judicial construction of superceded legislation-
even erroneous construction-was, in the dissent's view, inconsistent
with the division of power in government.' 23
Moreover, an examination of traditional indices of congressional in-
tent persuaded the dissent that, preservation of private remedies aside,
Congress did not intend to create a private right of action by implica-
tion. The existence of an express remedy and a monetary limit on ha-
118. 102 S. Ct. at 1843-44.
119. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor joined Justice Powell in his
opinion.
120. 102 S. Ct. 1848, 1851-52. As Justice Powell explained, the theory unjustifiably elevates
the importance of lower federal courts:
Fewer than a dozen district courts wrongly create a remedy in damages under the CEA;
Congress fails to correct the error-, and congressional silence binds this Court to follow
the erroneous decisions of the district courts and courts of appeals. . . . Congress itself
surely would reject emphatically the Goodman view that federal courts are free to hold,
as a general rule of statutory interpretation, that private rights of action are to be implied
unless Congress "evidences a contrary intention."
Id at 1851-52.
121. Id at 1849-51.
122. Id Justice Powell argued that the error in the Goodman case, and the line of cases ren-
dered prior to the CFTCA, was that those cases based their decision solely on an inquiry into
whether a statute conferred a benefit on the class asserting the private right. Such an inquiry,
while appropriate for common-law courts, was inappropriate for implying private rights under a
federal statute where there is no federal common law. Id at 1849-51. See supra notes 34-38 and
accompanying text.
123. See supra note 120.
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bility provided persuasive evidence from which the Court could infer
that Congress did not intend to imply a private right of action against
the exchanges.124. Justice Powell questioned, even in light of the stated
goal of strengthening enforcement, the necessity of an implied right of
action when Congress provided an express, duplicative remedy in repa-
rations proceedings.'25 Finally, Justice Powell pointed out that the ma-
jority ignored the only unambiguous evidence of congressional intent:
a chart comparing features of several proposed versions of the CFTCA
with the Commodity Exchange Act. This chart failed to indicate the
availability of an implied private right of action under the old Act.' 26
The dissent concluded that such traditional evidence of congressional
intent, coupled with the novelty of the majority's theory of statutory
construction, merely indicates that Congress failed to disapprove Good-
man, not that it approved of the decision's effect.' 27
C. The Course of Recent Supreme Court Construction of Private
Rights of Action
The decision in Curran represents an aberration in an otherwise un-
interrupted trend in the Supreme Court toward a narrow and strict
construction of the availability of implied private rights of action. In
the area of economic regulation, the Supreme Court's willingness to
imply a private right of action reached a highwater mark in J.z Case v.
Borak.28 In Borak, the Court reasoned that when Congress has legis-
lated against a specific evil and a private right of action would aid en-
forcement, the courts should imply such a right. 129  The Court's
decision in Cort v. Ash 130 signalled the emergence of a stricter standard
for the implication of private rights. The four factors-an especial
class, legislative intent, consistency with the statutory purposes, and
124. 102 S. Ct. at 1852-53. Specifically, Justice Powell noted that Congress provided explicit
sanctions for nonenforcement of exchange rules. He found it unusual that Congress would at
once place a limit on the statutory liability at $100,000 under 7 U.S.C. § 13a so as not to impair the
exchanges' ability to regulate trade, and yet continue to permit private rights of action to be main-
tained when such unlimited liability could financially cripple the exchanges. 102 S. Ct. at 1852-53.
125. Id at 1853.
126. Id at 1853, 1855. The chart appeared in Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 194. Under
the designation "Civil money penalties," the chart indicated that no such remedies existed under
the Commodity Exchange Act. 102 S. Ct. at 1855.
127. 102 S. Ct. at 1854.
128. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
129. Id at 431-33.
130. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See supra notes 65-68.
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federal preemption- 3 all demanded a sharper analytic focus on the
suitability of a private right of action to a particular statutory scheme.
In the last several years, however, the Court has taken an even stricter
approach to implying private rights. In particular, the Court has held
that of the four Con factors, congressional intent to create a private
right of action primarily controls. 3 2  Reflecting recent conservative
criticism of "judicial legislating"'133 and a return to "plain language"
construction,134 the Supreme Court has announced its unwillingness to
imply remedies when the statutory language and legislative history are
silent. 35  Indeed, the Court's recent construction of each of the first
three Cort factors suggests that it has imposed a greater burden of
proof on parties asserting private rights of action.
With respect to the first Cori factor, the Court has begun to apply
literally the requirement that a complaining party belong to an especial
beneficiary class under the statute. If Congress intended the statute to
benefit the general public, especially when the basis of the asserted
right is a criminal statute, then the Court will refuse to infer especial
benefit.' 36  Further, if the parties asserting private rights are members
of the class that Congress sought to regulate, then ascribing especial
131. See supra note 68.
132. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23 (1979); Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688
(1979); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 419 (1975); National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974). In Transamerica,
the Court summarized its predominant attitude by stating that "where a statute expressly provides
a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it." 444 U.S. at 458
(1974). See also T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 471 (1959); Botany Mills v. United
States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929).
133. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 743-47 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
134. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
135. Justice Rehnquist, in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), argued that
the failure of Congress to provide a damage remedy for violation of federal securities laws con-
trolled the implication of private rights of action when Congress demonstrated no intent to create
such rights. According to Justice Rehnquist:
If there is to be any federal damage remedy under these circumstances, Congress must
provide it. "[I]t is not for us to fill any hiatus Congress has left in this area." Obviously,
nothing we have said prevents Congress from creating a private right of action ....
But if Congress intends those customers to have such a federal right of action, it is well
aware of how it may effectuate that intent.
Id at 575 (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963)) (emphasis in original).
136. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1976); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Securities Investor Protection
Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
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benefit to such parties is illogical and inconsistent with congressional
intent. 137
Prior to Curran, the Supreme Court had emphasized that when a
statute provides express remedies, the Court would not imply addi-
tional remedies.' 38  Thus, contrary to its holding in Curran, the Court
construed the omission of a particular remedy among other express
remedies as an indication, in the plain language of the statute, that
Congress intended to exclude additional remedies.139 Further, the
Court has held that a sufficiently broad scope of express remedies ne-
gated an inferred congressional intent implying private rights of ac-
tion.14 ° The Court has also held that instead of a defendant bearing the
burden or proving the exclusivity of a remedy, the complaining party
must prove that Congress intended to create a private right. 141 By criti-
cizing agency interpretations 42 and isolated sponsor remarks 143 as un-
reliable indicia of intent, the Court pared those sources which might
demonstrate that Congress intended a private right of action. When
Congress has chosen not to speak, the Court has refused to speak in its
stead; more significantly, it has refused to continue to imply a right
existing under a previous enactment. 144 Finally, the Court has refused
137. "[A] party whose previously unregulated conduct was purposely brought under federal
control by the statute . . . can scarcely lay claim to the status of 'beneficiary' whom Congress
considered in need of protection." Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 37 (1977).
138. See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm., 445 U.S. 136, 148 (1980); Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour,
421 U.S. 412,419 (1975); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 458 (1974).
139. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 20 (1979).
140. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979).
141. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979). See also
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 419 (1975).
142. Although agency pronouncements often indicate the proper interpretation of a statute,
see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 706-08 (1979), the Supreme Court has held
that where the narrow issue presented is whether jurisdiction of federal courts should be invoked
to hear an implied right of action, courts are more competent to resolve the matter. Piper v. Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41 (1977).
143. See, e.g., Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118
(1980); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 203-04, 203 n. 24 (1976).
144. See T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 472-75 (1959). In TM.E., the Court
held that without a clear indication that Congress intended to preserve a private right of action
implied under a predecessor act, the Court should not imply one under an amended act. Interest-
ingly, the statute involved in TM.E., the Motor Carrier Act, had created reparations proceed-
ings for the settlement of claims alleging unreasonable rate charges. There, the Court noted that a
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to confer new rights on the basis of congressional silence.'45 In short,
absent express statutory language, pre-Curran complaining parties had
to demonstrate a positive congressional intent to create or preserve a
private right of action.' 6
III. LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
UNDER THE CFTCA
Whatever may be said for the validity of the Court's "contemporary
legal context" theory of statutory construction, an examination of the
legislative history of the CFTCA reveals that Congress did not view the
continued existence of an implied private right of action as necessary or
proper.
As noted previously,'47 courts have indicated that Congress knew of
decisions implying a private right of action under the Commodity Ex-
change Act. The construction of the CFTCA thus depends, as the ma-
jority in Leist indicated, on whether Congress intended to preserve a
private right of action.'48 Further, because Congress created a private
right of action before administrative law judges in reparations proceed-
ings,' 49 but included no statutory language on court enforcement of
private rights under the Act,150 the Cort test seemingly requires an ad-
ditional showing of legislative intent to create a private right of action.
Statutory silence alone does not necessarily mean that Congress in-
tended to deny such rights.' 5 ' An examination of the structure and
legislative history of the Act, however, reveals neither an intent to cre-
ate a private right of action nor an intent to preserve rights previously
implied under the Commodity Exchange Act. In addition, the general
purposes of the Act reveal that private rights of action are inconsistent
with, and superfluous to, the enforcement mechanisms provided by
Congress.
court adjudication in light of available reparations proceedings would be redundant and "anoma-
lous." Id at 474.
145. See supra notes 132 & 135 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 144.
147. See supra notes 64-68.
148. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
150. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
151. "[T]he failure of Congress expressly to consider a private remedy is not inevitably incon-
sistent with an intent on its part to make such a remedy available." Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979).
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Initially, as noted by the majority in Leist,15 2 Congress was con-
cerned with the influx of speculators into the commodity markets, and
their subsequent losses.153 Responding to constituents' perceptions that
the claim settlement procedures were inadequate under the 1936 Act, 154
Congress completely overhauled the enforcement provisions of the
Commodity Exchange Act'55 by strengthening governmental regula-
tion of the exchanges 56 and mandating the creation of new procedures
for the settlement of customer grievances. 5 7 Congress did not indicate
that it viewed speculators as a class more in need of protection than
other classes in or out of the market.1 58 Indeed, Congress reiterated its
152. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
153. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1974). According to the House Report,
an exodus of speculative traders from the securities markets to the commodities markets was one
of the "specific situations mandat[ing] a comprehensive rewrite of futures trading regulation." Id
See also 119 CONG REc. H41,332 (1973) (remarks by Rep. Poage). Representative Poage, Chair-
man of the House Agriculture Committee, noted that trading in commodities options on unregu-
lated exchanges, as well as poor bookkeeping practices among registered merchants, had resulted
in merchant bankruptcies and the loss of customers' money. In one instance cited, $71 million in
customers' accounts were lost in the failure of an options trading firm. Id
154. The major objection to the claim settlement procedures appeared to be grounded in cus-
tomer perceptions of industry bias. As stated in the House Report:
[B]ecause not all commodities are covered under the present Act, many attempts at self-
regulation in those exchanges have been and continue to fail. Attempted investigations
in regulated exchanges are often characterized by the unwillingness of the investigating
committees composed of exchange members to inquire too closely into the possible ex-
cesses of their own brethren. In one or more unregulated exchanges it is continually
charged that the owners of the exchange manipulate and evade the traditional rules for
their own gain. Brokers, customers, and, eventually, the American economy suffers in
this atmosphere of so-called "self-regulation" where tradition and self-interest has been
allowed to displace the public interest.
H.R. REp. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1974).
155. Outlining the purposes of the Act, the House Report described the Act as "the first com-
plete overhaul of the Commodity Exchange Act since its inception, and proposes a comprehensive
regulatory structure to oversee the volatile and esoteric futures trading complex." Id at I (empha-
sis added).
156. See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
158. The Congress could at best be described as ambivalent about speculators. On the one
hand, Congress recognized that speculators performed a useful function in the market by ac-
cepting part ofthe risk in futures contracting. See, e.g., 119 CONG Rac. H41,332 (1973) (statement
by Rep. Poage); 120 CONG. REc. H10,736 (1974). Typical is the statement of Representative
Mayne:
While the speculator has been much maligned to the point where some critics of the
present marketing system have tried to make "speculator" a dirty word, we must not
forget that the speculator performs an important economic function in futures markets
.... There are of course bad speculators as well as good but.., we should not let the
rotten apples in the barrel poison our impression of the entire lot. H.R. 13113 will pro-
vide those regulations which are reasonably necessary to guide the activities of specula-
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long-standing criticism of the effect of speculators on commodity mar-
kets. 159 Moreover, Congress expressed concern that confficting inter-
pretations of the Commodity Exchange Act hampered the regulation of
the increasingly important commodity markets. 160 Consistent with this
concern, Congress sought to confine the enforcement of the CFTCA to
the newly created Commodity Futures Trading Commission. By giv-
ing the Commission exclusive jurisdiction 6' over the regulation of
commodity futures contracts, Congress sought to create a consistent
body of law'62 and to promote stricter enforcement of the rules by ex-
changes.' 63 Rather than rejecting the concept of industry self-regula-
tion in favor of broad-based private enforcement of the Act, Congress
designed the CFTCA to correct malfunctions in exchange self-
regulation. 164
tors as well as other segments of the market and no legitimate speculator or other market
participant should object to the provisions.
120 CONG. REc. H10,739 (1974) (emphasis added).
On the other hand, Congress clearly thought it necessary to regulate the activities of speculators,
not regulate the market for the benefit of speculators. As the language emphasized above indi-
cates, Congress did not view speculators as a class mor- especial than "other market participants."
Indeed, Senator Talmadge explained several times that the purpose of the CFTCA was "to further
the fundamental purpose of the Commodity Exchange Act in insuring fair practice and honest
dealing on the commodity exchanges and providing a measure of control over those forms of
speculative activity which often demoralize the markets to the injury of producers, consumers, and
the exchanges themselves." S. RaP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974); CONG. REc. S30,458
(1974).
159. Id See also supra note 18.
160. Specifically, Congress observed that two trends had caused confusion in commodity regu-
lation. First, Congress feared that states were beginning to regulate areas not covered by federal
law. Second, Congress noted that conflicting court interpretations on the jurisdiction ofcommod-
ity and security regulators and exchange antitrust liability had confused the regulation of com-
modities. H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1974).
161. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
162. One of the considerations prompting the House to propose changes in the regulatory
structure was "c]onfusion in court decisions" on the jurisdiction of securities and commodities
regulators and the regulatory activities of the exchanges. H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
48 (1974). Viewed four years later, the chairman of the CFTC, William Bagley, saw consistency
of interpretation as the advantage of reparations proceedings. "One of the values of a reparations
process of private claim adjudication by the CFTC is that over the years we will be able to de-
velop for the public a body of law." Extend Commodity Exchange Act: Hearings on H. 10285
Before the Subcomna on Conservation and Credit of the House Comm. on .4griculture, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 632 (1978).
163. See supra notes 124 & 155 and accompanying text.
164. This sentiment was implicit in the Act's new method of approving exchange rules. See
supra note 47. More directly, the House Report concluded:
The Committee bill does not propose that self-regulatory activities of the exchanges be
abolished in favor of continued and direct federal regulation of all aspects of futures
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The creation of reparations proceedings constituted the most impor-
tant corrective measure for enforcement procedures. Congress was in-
formed that because of weaknesses in the Commodity Exchange Act,
private rights of action were being implied against trading profession-
als and exchanges. 165 The weaknesses in the old Act led Congress to
trading. ... Self-regulation is a commendable and noble concept and useful in such a
complex atmosphere as that which surrounds futures trading. It cannot continue to func-
tion without a strong Federal regulatory umbrella over self-regulatory activities of the
industry .... Yet, with proper Federal supervisory authority, needed self-regulatory
efforts of the exchanges can live a useful life into the 21st century and, hopefully,
beyond.
H.R. RaP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1974).
165. The remarks made by Representatives and Senators were usually stated in conclusory
fashion. Typical was Chairman Poage's statement that "the courts began to look upon exchange
self-regulation as a guarantee to the public that its members would not violate its code of conduct.
Additionally, when the Commodity Exchange Act was enacted, courts implied a private remedy
for individual litigants in the Commodity Exchange Act." 119 CONo. REc. H41,333 (1973). See,
e.g., H.R. REP. No. 975. 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24-26, 45-48 (1974) (explaining the relation between
court-imposed liability and exchange rulemaking); S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 202, 205,
415, 524, 526, 737, 746 (1974) (alluding to the availability of a private right of action under the
Commodity Exchange Act); 1973 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 121, 123 (detailing exchange
liability for nonenforcement of rules).
Interestingly, Senator Talmadge, the Chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee, although
recognizing that individuals had previously taken their claims to court, suggested that the pro-
posed reparations procedure, impliedly a forum of first instance, would reduce the burden on the
courts. He stated that:
The vesting in the Commission of the authority to have administrative law judges and
apply a broad spectrum of civil and criminal penalties is likewise not intended to inter-
fere with the courts in any way. It is hoped that giving the Commission this authority
will somewhat lighten the burden upon the courts, but the entire appeal process and the
right offinal determination by the courts are expressly preserved.
120 CONG. REc. S30,459 (1974) (emphasis added). The majority in Leist, examining the same
language, concluded that Senator Talmadge must not have thought reparations an exclusive rem-
edy because exclusivity would certainl reduce the burden on the courts. Leist v. Simplot, 638
F.2d 283, 313 (2d Cir. 1980). The reasoning is flawed for two reasons. First, because all adversely
affected parties may appeal a reparations order, the burden could conceivably remain the same.
Second, Senator Talmadge's reference to the preservation of appellate review was ignored by the
Leist majority. The reference indicates that the Senator's tentative conclusion was based on the
availability of appellate review, not the continued existence of a private right of action. At the
very least, the "hope" expressed by Senator Talmadge suggests that he believed the availability of
reparations proceedings would eliminate the need to continue to imply private rights of action.
Actually, Representative Poage indicated with greater clarity the role of the courts under the
CFTCA. That role, alluded to by Senator Talmadge, was appellate, nor original. From the floor
of the House, Chairman Poage indicated:
The Commission will have original jurisdiction to consider all such complaints which
have not been resolved through the informal settlement procedures required of the con-
tract markets and registered futures associations under the bill . . . . Initially, com-
plaints would be considered by an Administrative Law Judge and then reviewed by the
Commission before a final order is entered.
A special judicial review of Commission decisions will be established for these pro-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss2/7
Number 2] PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
strengthen enforcement'l 6 by providing a private right of action in rep-
arations proceedings. 167 Viewed in this context, creation of an express
remedy by Congress after notice that rights had been implied under the
1936 Act suggests congressional dissatisfaction with implied rights. In-
deed, members of Congress did criticize implied rights of action. 16
Moreover, it would be anomalous to conclude that Congress, after pro-
viding a method for traders to recover unlimited damages and secure a
complete remedy, would then sanction an additional, redundant forum.
Finally, Congress rejected several Senate bills which expressly allowed
private suits for violations of the Act. 69
Similarly, the civil penalty and exclusive jurisdiction provisions of
the CFTCA are inconsistent with implying private rights. In reference
to the former, Congress indicated that the civil penalties imposed for
breaches of prescribed duties were intended to deter, not compen-
sate.170 Perhaps the strongest indication of this intention was the fram-
ing of the provisions in terms of duties, not rights.' 7 ' Further,
congressional reluctance to impair the function of exchanges by impos-
ing heavy fines also indicates that Congress was concerned with the
ceedings which will allow either party adversely affected to appeal to the U.S. District
Court.
119 CONG. REc. H41,334 (1974). See also 120 CONG. REc. H10,737 (1974) (statement by Rep.
Poage).
166. See supra note 44.
167. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
168. The complaint that the exchanges were not effectively policing the market was premised
on the liability imposed by courts for nonenforcement of rules. See supra note 42. In this in-
stance, private rights of action produced deleterious effects on the regulatory structure. See also
infra note 172. Similarly, the enactment of reparations proceedings without statutory mention of
private rights of action suggests by implication that reparations proceedings were viewed as a
superior remedy. Indeed, the House Report contemplated reparations proceedings as "a separate
remedy designed to supplement the informal 'settlement procedures' contemplated by the contract
markets," not as a supplement to private rights of action. H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
22 (1974).
169. Although it is true that two Senate bills would have authorized treble damages in private
actions, the Senate made no attempt to strike the treble damage feature from either or incorporate
the provision into the House version, despite the urging of several witnesses. See, e.g., 1974 Senate
Hearings, supra note 9, at 737, 746 (statement of Professor Schotland).
170. Congress found that one of the difficulties in past enforcement procedure was that the
severity of the sanctions did not deter violations because the Commodity Exchange Commission
was reluctant to impose a sanction that often meant ruining a merchant's business. According to
the House Report, the availability of money penalties "would enable Administrative Law Judges
• . . to levy a sanction which better fits the violation." H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 51
(1974). See supra note 43.
171. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
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effects of implied rights against exchanges.1 72
The Commission's exclusive jurisdiction under section 2 of the
CFTCA'73 is likewise inconsistent with an implied private right of ac-
tion. Congress viewed exclusive jurisdiction as necessary to the devel-
opment of a consistent body of law. 74 Moreover, Congress did not
intend for the jurisdictional savings clause in the second proviso of sec-
tion 2 to preserve jurisdiction for the courts which arose from previous
judicial findings of a implied private right of action.' 75 Congress added
the proviso only at the insistence of House Judiciary Chairman Rodino
after he expressed concern that the original section 2 might deprive the
federal courts of jurisdiction to hear antitrust cases. 176 In addition, the
172. Congress pointedly criticized private rights of action against exchanges. One of the "ad-
ditional considerations" which prompted the House to act was the "[girowing difficulties facing
exchanges engaged in self-regulatory actions as a result of private plaintiffs seeking damages
against self-regulatory activities of the markets. As examples, exchanges are sued for actions
taken in emergency situations even when the action has been taken at the request (or order) of
CEA." H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1974). Congress was also aware of the effect
such claims had on exchanges. A representative of several New York commodity exchanges in-
formed the House Committee that the Chicago Board of Trade, acting at the request of the CEA,
imposed limits on soybean trading. As a result, the Board became the target of $200 million class
action suit by persons claiming to have been injured by the imposition of those limits. 1973 House
Hearings, supra note 2, at 121. Viewed in this context, the penalties imposed by the CFTCA
obviate any intent of Congress to allow unlimited civil damages to be claimed by private litigants.
Besides limiting the maximum penalty to $100,000, the statute commands that the Commission
"in the case of a contract market shall further consider whether the amount of the penalty will
materially impair the contract market's ability to carry on its operations and duties." 7 U.S.C.
§ 13a (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Moreover, the 1978 amendments to the CFTCA authorized a pri-
vate right of action in the form of parens patriae suits, but specifically exempted contract markets.
7 U.S.C. § 13a-2 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
173. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
175. When Congress commanded that the CFTCA would not "supercede or limit the jurisdic-
tion conferred" on any court, it did not have the preservation of private rights of action in mind.
120 CONG. REc. H34,737 (1974). In the first place, jurisdiction was never conferred by the statute.
More important, however, was the underlying intent of Congress. Congress was concerned that a
regulatory lag would develop between the time of enactment and implementation of the CFTCA.
The reparations procedure would not become effective until one year after the enactment of the
CFTCA. 120 CoNG. Rac. S34,996 (1974) (statement of Senator Curtis). In the interim, Congress
did not want to withdraw jurisdiction from pending cases. As detailed by Chairman Poage:
[S]ection 412 was included in the bill to make clear that all pending proceedings, includ-
ing ongoing investigations, as well as court proceedings, should continue unabated by
any provision of the act. This also is necessary to prevent the creation of regulatory gaps,
particularly during the time between the adoption of this legislation and the full imple-
mentation of its provisions by the CFTC.
120 CONG. REc. H34,737 (1974).
176. Chairman Rodino expressed concern that the exclusive jurisdiction provision might de-
prive state courts of their jurisdiction to enforce many of the contracts "under recognized commer-
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preservation of federal and state court jurisdiction indicates that Con-
gress intended to preserve court jurisdiction to hear common-law con-
tract cases, not cases arising from violations of the Act.'77 Finally, the
new enforcement procedures, in conjunction with the Commission's ex-
clusive jurisdiction, suggest that judicial reliance on the incorporation
or prior constructions of the CFTCA is inapposite.'78  Although Con-
gress reenacted certain provisions in essentially the same form,'179 it
substantially changed the enforcement procedures of the Act.' In
sum, Congress, dissatisfied with past enforcement of commodity regu-
lations, erected a new and complete structure for the enforcement of
duties and the vindication of rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
Several factors weigh heavily against the implication of private rights
of action under the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act.
From the standpoint of statutory construction, the case for a private
right ofaction is doubtful at best. The legislative history reveals, on the
one hand, a congressional knowledge of implied rights of action under
the Commodity Exchange Act, and on the other, criticism of such
rights and a complete restructuring of the enforcement procedures.'
8
'
Private rights of action under the Act, rather than strengthening
commodity regulatory enforcement, may have a deleterious effect. The
private right of action could subject exchanges to unlimited and ruin-
cial law and contract principles," as well as federal courts of their jurisdiction to hear antitrust
claims and review administrative procedures. 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 260.
177. The statutory reference to contract claims, 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976), distinguishes claims of
contract fraud in the factum or inducement and contract breaches. Contract fraud, which is the
predominant basis for the claim of a private right of action, was placed within the CFTC's en-
forcement purview. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. A breach of contract claim, which,
by the nature of the contract, would mean that a party had refused to deliver or accept delivery of
the commodity, is apparently left to the jurisdiction of the states. Nevertheless, it is highly un-
likely that such a claim would arise without fraud, or, as in the Leist case, market manipulation.
In the first place, a party promising delivery can "buy back" the contract for delivery and thereby
cancel the obligation. Second, a long or short position unable to meet a margin call on a contract
would have its position liquidated by the futures commission merchant handling the account.
178. The CFTCA was more than a reenactment. The House Report described the Act as an
"overhaul" designed to create a "comprehensive regulatory structure." H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974). See supra note 155.
179. Id See also supra notes 45-55.
180. Id
181. See supra notes 168 & 178 and accompanying text.
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ous liability, 82 impairing the stability of the commodity market and
the exchanges themselves. Further, the continued existence of private
rights of action makes the civil enforcement procedures of the Act re-
dundant. Potential plaintiffs will have no reason to seek an administra-
tive remedy subject to judicial appeal when the courts may be entered
in the first instance. The costs of private enforcement in both time and
money may considerably exceed the costs of public enforcement. In
addition, a divergence of competence and multiplicity of opinion will
lead to the lack of uniform interpretation of commodity regulations
that Congress tried to avoid. 8 3 Moreover, the CFTC enforcement staff
will become increasingly confined to criminal sanction enforcement.
Whether this will lead to a net improvement in regulatory enforcement
is not clear. Now operating under a two year extention of existence,!84
the CFTC will continue to be a subject of congressional and industry
scrutiny as continued growth and trading innovations dictate.
H. Mark Vieth
182. The Chicago Board of Trade and the Commodity Exchange of New York (Comex) are
presently defending a class action suit for more than a billion dollars arising from the Hunt broth-
ers' alleged manipulation of the silver futures market during 1980. See Amicus Curiae Brief for
Nine United States Commodity Exchanges in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, New
York Mercantile Exch. v. Leist, No. 80-757 (1980), 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (referring to the action in
Strax v. Commodity Exch., Civ. No. 79-5366 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
183. See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
184. See Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, § 228 (1983).
The question of whether a private right of action continues to exist was resolved during the
reauthorization. In an ironic twist, Congress apparently responded to the Curran decision by
codifying the private right of action recognized by the Supreme Court. See id at § 235 (to be
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 25).
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